To what extent does the institution of insurance influence a system of compensation for personal injury? On the one hand some academics have suggested that insurance has been no more than a "makeweight" argument in the development of tort liability. On the other hand, others have claimed that insurance has had a substantial effect, even if this is often hidden or not discussed openly. This article lends support to one side of the debate by describing the enormous importance of insurers to personal injury litigation in the United Kingdom. It argues that all cases, in their wider context, have been affected by the practices of insurance companies. This is the case even though insurance is rarely mentioned by judges and largely ignored by textbooks on tort law. Insurers provide the lifeblood of the system. The article examines statistics relating to the number of tort claims brought each year and it notes the extent of insurer involvement. As the paymasters of the system, insurers not only compensate claimants but also fund the cost of legal representation, often for both sides. Insurers have reduced their use of defence lawyers and the extent that they institute formal legal proceedings. However, it is their bureaucracy which determines whether, when and for how much claims are settled, and it is their offices, rather than courts of law, that are the key places for tort in practice. The scope for compensating those injured very much depends upon the incidence of insurance protection, and the amount of damages paid can only be understood against the insurance background. Finally, the article considers the influence of insurers upon potential changes in the law. The importance of insurers ought not to be underestimated: without insurance, the system of compensation for personal injury would have collapsed long ago.
Introduction
This article summarises the structural importance of insurers to the system of compensation for personal injury in the U.K. It is part of a much wider study of the relationship between the rules of tort law, on the one hand, and the availability of insurance, on the other.
1 It has been argued that judges appear more ready to impose liability when insurance enables the cost of compensation to be more widely distributed. 2 Tort rules have been said to have been developed in favour of claimants, at least in situations where they have been less able to protect themselves by taking out their own first party insurance. Others have denied that there is any consistent pattern in the law which reflects such a close relationship with insurance. 3 However,
here it is argued that the overall influence of insurers upon the system makes it difficult to view any tort case in isolation: each and every case is affected, no matter whether determined in court or out of it. The detailed rules of tort are not examined
here. 4 Instead we concentrate upon the institutional context within which tort law is The structure of this article falls into four broad and inter-related parts:-
(1) We first set out the number of claims made each year for personal injury in the U.K. and argue that the real defendants in the great majority of these cases are not individuals but insurance companies. Insurers are the paymasters of the tort system, being responsible not only for the damages received by claimants but also the costs obtained by the lawyers on either side. Those who pay the piper also call the tune, and the influence insurers are able to bear as a result is considerable.
(2) The article next examines how the bureaucratic organisation of insurance, rather than the payment of the parties, affects the course and the outcome of litigation.
The structure of the insurance industry is such that the defence of claims is concentrated in the hands of only a few companies and law firms, and economic pressures mean that the vast majority of cases are settled out of court, many without the involvement of defence lawyers at all. Judges also have a very limited role to play, being involved in only one per cent of cases. The realities of the settlement system are such that, in practice, the strict rules of tort law are simplified and result in many more claimants obtaining compensation than the rules actually support. At the same time this liberal system can be seen as inequitable because success is dependent not upon theoretical liability rules but upon suffering the type of injury for which liability insurance has been made compulsory. Small claims are over-compensated whereas victims of serious injury are under-compensated. This "lottery of litigation" is compounded by the pressures which the system places upon individual claimants with the result that those from a particular class or background will do better than others, but only rarely will they obtain the sums which would be awarded by a judge at trial.
(3) Consideration of the sums obtained by claimants leads us into the third part of the article which stresses the importance of insurers to the award of damages. Without a mechanism for distributing the resulting costs it would rarely be worth the time and effort we presently expend to establish the liability to pay. Insurers provide the lifeblood of the system.
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(4) The final section examines the influence of insurers upon government and the creation of legislation. The lobbying of insurers, especially in private, has been extremely effective in conserving the older and perhaps outdated values enshrined in the tort system. This leads to the final conclusion that without insurance the tort system could not have survived. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider what might have taken its place as a fairer and more efficient system of accident compensation. However, we are left with an appreciation of the importance of insurers to present tort law, and a denial of the claim that insurance has had only a limited effect upon the legal system.
The Number of Claims
Last year in the U.K. there were 755,000 claims brought for personal injury -one for every 77 people. 5 Although the previous year was responsible for a record number of claims, the overall trend shows that the underlying rate of claim has remained relatively constant since 1997 when new methods of recording claims were introduced. It is true that the overall number of claims had previously increased to reach a peak of 770,000, but this increase was wholly attributable to the special circumstances which had caused an exceptional rise in disease claims as opposed to accidents.
What were these special circumstances? Disease claims rose almost threefold over the two years to 2004, from 74,000 to 213,000 a year. This was the result of the impetus created by the imposition of a cut off date for claims under the special compensation rules devised for particular diseases suffered by coalminers. Law firms intensively solicited these claims, and since 1999 they have registered over 740,000 of them. These coalmining claims supposedly constitute "the biggest personal injury 
The Paymasters
Insurers are the paymasters of the tort system, being responsible for 94 per cent of tort compensation for personal injury. 11 They process the routine payments and they decide which elements of damage they will accept or contest. It is unusual for them to contest liability, one recent study revealing that insurers" files "contained remarkably little discussion of liability," finding it initially denied in only 20 per cent of cases.
12
As a result, eventually insurers make at least some payment in the great majority of personal injury claims, often because most of them are of very low value. Overall about 89 per cent of motor claims and 77 per cent of employers liability claims are successful, 13 although it has been suggested that of 150,000 cases supported by trade unions, about 95 per cent result in some payment to the claimant. 14 Tort thus provides a structure for processing mass payments of small amounts of compensation; only very rarely does it stage a gladiatorial contest to determine whether a particular defendant was in the wrong. Contrary to the impression gained from tort textbooks, duty of care, causation of damage, and even breach of duty are generally not in dispute in cases processed by the system.
In the great majority of cases insurers pay not only compensation to claimants, but also the litigation costs of both sides. 
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accident claims, and their market penetration is expected to continue to increase.
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Legal expenses insurance can affect key aspects of the litigation. 16 In particular, claimants cannot easily choose their own lawyer and may be required to use one from a panel approved by the insurer. 17 As a result it is estimated that soon almost all road accident cases will be dealt with by no more than a hundred of the 9,000 solicitors" firms nationwide. 18 The clients of these solicitors may receive a different service compared to those claimants free to choose their own lawyer: conflicts of interest are more likely to arise. 19 Insurers thus fund the tort system, control much of the representation, and can have an interest in whatever the outcome of a claim.
Insurers' Bureaucratic Organisation
Classic empirical studies reveal that, in practice, the rules of tort law are much less important than the textbooks might lead one to suppose: it is insurance bureaucracy that dictates the course of litigation procedure, and determines whether, when, and for how much, claims are settled. 20 The important centres of personal injury practice are insurers" buildings, rather than courts of law, or even solicitors' offices. A senior judge has even suggested that solicitors might no longer be involved with small claims where defendants are insured, and that insurers could be left to administer these claims alone. 21 In effect this is what may happen if a particular reform is brought to fruition: prompted by the Better Regulation Task Force, 22 the Government is considering whether to raise from £1,000 to £5,000 the limit for personal injury claims which may be taken through the small claims procedure without costs being awarded for legal representation. Claimant lawyers are alarmed at the prospect and have campaigned to resist the change. Whether or not this campaign succeeds, it is already the case that insurers" offices are the key places for determining most tort claims.
They could be even more important in the future.
The number of such insurance centres has declined recently because of company mergers and greater specialisation. The work has been concentrated in particular localities. Consolidation in the general liability market has resulted in it being dominated by only eight major companies, although there are more than fifty other smaller firms issuing policies. market. 24 The three quarters of a million claimants suffering personal injury last year therefore came up against only a few handfuls of real defendants.
In dealing with claims, insurers have developed highly systematised approaches which make extensive use of information technology. Their standard procedures have been refined further for the "fast track" cases involving smaller amounts of money.
They closely monitor the performance of not only their in-house claims handlers but also the lawyers they choose to instruct. Striving for efficiency, they have reduced the number of solicitors" firms acting for them. Economic pressures mean that communication between the parties takes place on the telephone rather than via letters or face to face meetings, and the outcome of a claim is likely to be influenced as much by an impersonal computerised assessment as by the discretion of the claims handler involved. 25 Although these generalisations about how litigation is conducted do not apply to all insurers for every type of case, 26 they have a great effect upon the way in which tort rules are viewed and used in practice.
The Use of Lawyers and Courts
Insurers determine the extent that lawyers become involved in disputes, and the tactics that are used in the proceedings. Increasingly cases are being settled at an early stage, and without resort to the issue of court documents. One survey found all parties in agreement that, after recent reforms of civil procedure, cases were now more likely to be resolved without court involvement. 27 Major insurers estimated that, because of earlier settlement, the number of cases disposed of only after the issue of formal proceedings had declined by a third. According to the Court Service the number of new claims issued in the county court has fallen by 32 per cent in the past five years. costs award if the action is continued. 31 In this sense tort principles have been shaped by and for insurers, even though there has been a significant growth in the power and expertise of claimant lawyers in the last twenty years.
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The Realities of the Settlement System
Insurers" influence upon settlements is even more pronounced than it is upon decided cases. The lawyer asked by his client to advise on the merits of a claim is concerned with the realities of the litigation system rather than the formal rules of law.
Practitioners would agree with the key analysis of Ross 33 that the textbook rules of tort are often transformed when they come to be used in the system in three ways:
firstly, they are simplified; secondly, they are made more liberal; and thirdly, they are made more inequitable. The result of the cost pressures upon insurers is that the system is very liberal in that many more claims succeed than the strict rules of tort would allow. Often insurers pay something for claims which, on full investigation, would be without foundation.
As a result "… wherever there is insurance there is … a closer approximation to the objectives of social insurance in fact than the doctrines of tort law would lead one to suppose." 34 However, this liberality is but part of a system which overall is weighted in favour of insurers and results in much inequality. Indeed the case often used to illustrate the general inequalities in the legal system involves a "one-shotter" accident victim suing a "repeat player" insurer. 35 Delay, uncertainty, financial need and other pressures cause claimants to accept sums much lower than a judge would award. The eagerness of claimants and their solicitors to get something from the system is reflected in the fact that, in the past, in two out of three cases they accepted the very first formal offer made to them by the "risk neutral" insurer. 36 Although a more recent study discloses more bargaining, almost a third of cases still settled after only one offer, and two thirds settled after two. 37 The overall result of the settlement system is that rough and ready justice is dispensed, much influenced by the insurance company personnel and procedures, and driven by the needs of the insurance industry and the cost of the legal process. The system produces arbitrary results and bears only a limited relationship to the portrayal of justice contained in the traditional tort textbook.
The Effects of Compulsory Insurance
The importance of insurers to the tort system is reflected in the fact that the claims which are brought closely match the areas where liability insurance is to be found.
Thus road and work accidents predominate partly because those are the two major 38 Ross op cit. 
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areas where tort insurance is compulsory. 41 They constitute 86 per cent of all the claims brought for personal injury, with motor comprising 53 per cent of the total and employer liability 33 per cent. 42 They dominate the practice of tort even though they constitute a minority of all accidents, and are an even smaller percentage of the causes of all forms of disablement and incapacity for work. One survey found the more common accidents were those in the home, or suffered in the course of leisure activities or in playing sport, and yet very few of these resulted in any damages award. 43 Although work and transport injuries dominate the tort system, at best they are the cause of only about half of all accidents, 44 and some surveys suggest that they are much less important than this. For example, it has been estimated that there were 7.8 million accidents in the home in 1999 but in only 0.5 per cent of these was there the potential for a successful tort claim. 45 All this means that the place where you are injured is crucial. Accidents in areas not covered by liability insurance are extremely unlikely to be compensated.
According to one study, whereas 1 in 4 road accident victims and 1 in 10 work accident victims get something from tort, only 1 in 67 injured elsewhere do so. 
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Overall, only one accident victim in 16 who is incapacitated for three days of more is compensated by the tort system. However, if we concern ourselves only with serious injuries, tort becomes much more important: where an accident causes incapacity for work for six months or more, almost a third of victims receive tort damages.
However, this increased significance of tort can then be severely undermined: the importance of the tort system is reduced tenfold if account is taken of those suffering disablement not from accidents alone, but from all causes, including congenital illness and disease. 47 Tort then has only a very marginal role to play, and is insignificant compared to the provision made by social security and the welfare state.
The scope of the tort system is affected not only by the areas where liability insurance has been made compulsory, but also by the existence of alternative sources of compensation. What opportunities are there for resort to either welfare payments from public insurance, or policy monies from first party private insurance? These may reduce the incentive to pursue a common law claim. The interrelationship of compensation systems cannot be discussed in detail here, 48 but one example will suffice to demonstrate the potential effects of other insurance systems upon tort. 49 The example is a historical one and, in practice, resulted in the abandonment of tort law for the great majority of work injuries. It derives from the "election" rule whereby workers injured in the course of their employment had to choose either to sue in tort or to claim private insurance benefits on a no-fault basis from their employer. They could not do both by obtaining these insurance benefits and pursuing an action in tort.
For a variety of reasons employees overwhelmingly opted, or were pressed into receiving the no-fault benefits, 50 leaving the tort system with a very limited role to play in the industrial field. 51 There was judicial criticism of the "deplorable" and "extremely shabby" tactics used by insurers to prevent tort claims being pursued.
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Eventually the "employer privilege" was abolished in 1948, 53 and since that time tort claims for work accidents have flourished, now constituting a third of all the actions brought in the U.K. 54 The privilege continues in North America, a few European countries, and increasingly in Australia.
Insurers and the Award of Damages
This influence of insurance upon the general pattern of tort liability is matched by its effect upon the level of compensation awarded. In the U.S.A. it is very clear that individual damages awards have been affected by the policy limits set by insurers.
There is evidence that lawyers do not pursue claims beyond these limits in order to obtain "blood money" from defendants personally. 55 However, in the U.K. the policy limits for a claim are almost never relevant. The unlimited basis of insurer liability is graphically illustrated by a case arising from the Selby rail disaster where a negligent motorist caused a railway accident resulting in his insurer being liable to various claimants for a total of £22 million. 56 Because of the absence of policy limits in the U.K. it is less easy to see the precise effect of insurance cover in the individual case.
However, here it is argued that the principles upon which damages are assessed implicitly recognise that it is a company with a deep pocket that will pay and not an whether the tort system would survive at all. 61 Insurance, in this sense, provides the lifeblood of tort.
In recent years major changes have been made to the assessment of damages, and many of these are predicated upon payment being made either by insurers or other large self-insured bodies. The assessment of damages has become ever more precise.
Actuarial and forensic accountancy evidence has become commonplace. Such matters as the discount rate for early receipt of damages, 62 the interest rate on delayed payment, 63 and the inflation factor enabling past awards to be compared with those of the present day have all been more closely linked to the wider financial world. In a few serious injury cases lump sum payment has been replaced in part by a structured settlement, a reform prompted, manufactured and, until recently, controlled by insurers and insurance intermediaries. 64 It is impossible to conceive of such developments -involving continuing lifetime obligations to make increasing payments -if it were not for the fact that individuals almost never pay tort damages themselves.
The argument here is that it is not easy to divorce these changing rules on assessment and payment of damages from the fact that it is insurers who run the tort system.
One of the main reasons for U.K. insurers forming their own trade association in 1917 was in order to respond to potential changes in the law. 65 The Association of British Insurers (ABI) has since grown to such an extent that, with the exception of the National Farmers" Union, it is now more than twice the size of any other trade association. 66 With an annual budget of over £20 million, it has been very effective in putting forward the industry"s point of view. Its lobbying of government ministries is such that one insurance commentator has even suggested that, internationally, institutions such as the ABI "see themselves as governing governments." 67 The ABI has also ensured that its case is heard in Parliament. Until 1997 one in ten The ABI is organised so as to respond to all government proposals to change the wide areas of law with which it is concerned, these extending far beyond the law of tort. In 1998 the U.K. government announced that no proposal for regulation which has an impact upon businesses would be considered by ministers without a "regulatory impact assessment" being carried out. Rather than being just another bureaucratic requirement, the new procedures offer business and industry a major opportunity to influence the policy and legislative process. 70 Parliamentary Bills are now accompanied by impact statements assessing the financial costs and benefits of the measures being proposed. In drawing up such statements civil servants are directed to consult widely. Twenty or so bodies are specifically named, one of them being the ABI. 71 As a result, it is automatic for the ABI to be asked to estimate the effect of proposed reforms on insurance premiums. Insurability is therefore now a relevant consideration whenever statutory changes affecting tort are being considered.
Although these impact statements have given insurers a formal opportunity to make representations to government, it is doubtful whether this has increased their influence very much. This is because their most effective representations continue to be exercised in private, behind closed doors. 72 One illustration of the effectiveness of such private lobbying is the overturning of a Law Commission recommendation that a particular financial formula be used to set 69 
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